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Introduction
Games of strategic complementarities are those in which any player increases his action in response to an increase in the level of actions of rivals. The complementarity idea for an individual agent goes back to Edgeworth (1881) with the notion that the marginal value of an action is increasing in the level of other actions available to the agent. Many games display strategic complementarities, including those with search, network externalities, oligopoly interaction, or technology adoption and patent races. Additional examples include coordination failures in macroeconomics and …nancial markets, as well as cumulative processes in the presence of complementarities.
The theory of monotone comparative statics and supermodular games (Topkis (1978 (Topkis ( , 1979 , Vives (1985 Vives ( , 1990 and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) ) provides the set of tools to deal with complementarities. This theory, in contrast to classical convex analysis, is based on order and monotonicity properties on lattices. The analysis of monotone comparative statics provides conditions under which solutions to optimization problems change monotonically with a parameter. The theory of supermodular games exploits order and monotonicity properties to ensure that the best response of a player to the actions of rivals is increasing in their level. The approach is powerful. In the class of supermodular games:
Very general strategy spaces, including indivisibilities and functional spaces such as those arising in dynamic or Bayesian games, are allowed.
Equilibrium in pure strategies exists (without requiring quasiconcavity of payo¤s).
The equilibrium set has an order structure with extremal elements (allowing a global analysis of the set).
There is an algorithm to compute extremal equilibria, which bound also the rationalizable set, and the equilibrium set has nice stability properties.
Monotone comparative statics results are obtained with minimal assumptions and unambiguous predictions are possible even in the presence of multiple equilibria.
The last point is particularly relevant since coordination failures and multiple equilibria are typical in the presence of complementarities. Bank or debt runs, currency crises, low activity equilibria, adoption externalities, and development traps are some examples.
In this paper I will provide a brief intuitive account of the theory based on a very simple framework and I will develop some connections with games of incomplete information and more in particular, global games. The reader is referred to Vives (2005) for a more detailed account of the summary presented in this paper, and to Topkis (1998) and Vives (1999) for general treatments of the tools and results associated to games of strategic complementarities.
I introduce a simple class of games in Section 2 to highlight the main results of the theory. 
The basic ideas in a simple framework
In a game of strategic complementarities -the term was coined in Bulow et al. (1983) -each player responds to an increase in the strategies of the rivals with an increase in his own strategy.
Consider a symmetric game with a continuum of players. The payo¤ to player i is given by (a i ; e a; ) where a i 2 [0; 1] is the action of the player, e a is the average or aggregate action, and is a payo¤-relevant parameter. Suppose that is smooth in all arguments with @ 2 = (@a i ) 2 < 0, and let r (e a; ) be the best response of an individual player to the aggregate action e a. Then any equilibrium will be symmetric, with e a = a i = a and ful…lling r (a; ) = a. For interior solutions, we have that @ =@a i = 0 and r ( ) is continuously di¤erentiable with
and the best reply is increasing if @ 2 =@a i @e a 0. Suppose also that @ 2 =@a i @ 0, so that an increase in increases the marginal pro…t of the action of a player and consequently his best response r ( ) :
A classical example of the model are adoption, search or aggregate demand externalities (see, e.g., Diamond (1981) , Dybvig and Spatt (1983) , or Cooper and John (1988) ). The action a i may be the e¤ort of trader i in looking for a partner or the adoption level of a technology. The bene…t is proportional to own e¤ort/adoption level and is increasing in the aggregate e¤ort/adoption level e a of others
with > 0 and where g ( ) and the cost of e¤ort/adoption C ( ) are increasing nonnegative functions.
In this case, @ 2 =@a i @e a = g 0 (e a) 0 and @ 2 =@a i @ = g (e a) 0.
In games of strategic complementarities we have typically multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria.
For example, suppose that g has an S-shaped function and C 0 (a) a. Then r (e a) = g (e a) and there may be three equilibria given by the solutions (i.e., a; b a; and a) to g (a) = a as depicted in the lower branch of Figure 1 . Larger activity equilibria dominate equilibria with less activity since there are positive spillovers: @ =@e a = a i g 0 (e a) 0.
2 Monopolistic competition provides another illustration. Here a i is the price of the variety produced by …rm i, e a the average price in the market and , say, the (common) marginal cost. We have then
with D ( ) the demand function. It is easy to check that @ 2 log =@a i @e a = @ 2 log D=@a i @e a > 0 in many demand systems -where the elasticity of demand for product i is decreasing in the average price.
Under this condition r 0 (e a) > 0 because best replies are invariant to an increasing transformation of the payo¤s, such as the logarithm. Furthermore, @ 2 =@a i @ = @D=@a i > 0 with downward sloping demand. The monopolistic competition model has been used extensively in the growth, development, regional, and international trade literatures to generate complementarities and multiplier processes (see Matsuyama (1995) for a survey).
Several properties of the equilibria in the examples are easy to derive:
1. Existence and order structure of the equilibrium set. There exists a largest (a) and a smallest (a) equilibrium.
2. Multiple equilibria and welfare. There are multiple equilibria when strategic complementarities are su¢ ciently strong: r 0 (a) > 1 for some candidate equilibrium such as point b a in Figure 1 .
Equilibria can be Pareto ranked when there are positive spillovers.
3. Stability and rationalizability. Best-reply dynamics starting at a = 0 (resp,. a = 1) converge to a (resp., a). Similarly, iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies de…nes two sequences that converge, respectively, to a and a. This means that rationalizable strategies will lie in the interval [a; a], and if the equilibrium is unique then the game will be dominance solvable (and globally stable).
4.
Comparative statics and multiplier e¤ ects. An increase in the parameter leads to an increased action in equilibrium, via out-of-equilibrium best-reply dynamics, and this increase will be over and above the direct e¤ect of the increase in the parameter. Indeed, increasing will move r ( ) upward (as in Figure 1) , and the equilibrium level of a will increase. Starting at a = a, the direct e¤ect will lead us to r(a) > a and the full equilibrium impact to a 0 > a. At a stable equilibrium a :
The multiplier is at work whether we focus on extremal (or stable) equilibria, or consider best-response dynamics after the perturbation. This is so even starting at an unstable equilibrium, or at an equilibrium that disappears once increases (e.g. in Figure 1 the unstable equilibrium b a disappears with the increase in , moving r ( ) upward, and best-reply dynamics lead to the new equilibrium a 0 ).
Supermodular games
Consider the game (A i ; i ; i 2 N ), where N is the set of players, i = 1; :::; n; A i is the strategy set and i the payo¤ of player i 2 N (de…ned on the cross product of the strategy spaces of the players A). Let a i 2 A i and a i 2 Q j6 =i A j (i.e., we denote by a i the strategy pro…le (a 1 ; :::; a n ) excluding the ith element). In Euclidean space a supermodular game is one where for each player i, the strategy set A i is a compact rectangle (or "box"), the payo¤ function i is continuous and ful…lls two complementarity properties: Supermodularity in own strategies ( i is supermodular in a i ): the marginal payo¤ to any strategy of player i is increasing in the other strategies of the player.
Strategic complementarity in rivals'strategies ( i has increasing di¤ erences in (a i ; a i )): the marginal payo¤ to any strategy of player i is increasing in any strategy of any rival player.
In a more general formulation of a supermodular game, strategy spaces need only be "complete lattices" and the continuity requirement can be weakened. Supermodularity and increasing di¤er-ences can also be weakened to de…ne an "ordinal supermodular"game, relaxing supermodularity to the weaker concept of quasi-supermodularity and increasing di¤erences to a single-crossing property (see Milgrom and Shannon (1994) ). Such properties -unlike supermodularity and increasing di¤erences-have no di¤erential characterization and need not be preserved under addition or partial maximization operations.
In a supermodular game, very general strategy spaces can be allowed. These include indivisibilities as well as functional strategy spaces, such as those arising in dynamic or Bayesian games.
Regularity conditions such as concavity and interior solutions can be dispensed with.
Results 1-4 in the simple framework, described in the previous section, generalize in a supermodular game:
1' There always exist extremal equilibria: a largest a and a smallest element a of the equilibrium set. If the game is symmetric the extremal equilibria are symmetric.
2' Multiple equilibria are common. If the game displays positive spillovers, i.e. the payo¤ to a player is increasing in the strategies of the other players, then the largest equilibrium point is the Pareto best equilibrium, and the smallest one the Pareto worst.
3' Simultaneous best-reply dynamics approach the "box" [a; a] de…ned by the smallest and the largest equilibrium points of the game; and converge monotonically downward (upward) to an equilibrium starting at any point in the intersection of the upper (lower) contour sets of the largest (smallest) best replies of the players. The extremal equilibria a and a correspond to the largest and smallest serially undominated strategies. Therefore, if the equilibrium is unique then the game is dominance solvable (and globally stable).
4' If i (a i ; a i ; ) has increasing di¤erences in (a i ; ) for each i then with an increase in : (i) the largest and smallest equilibrium points increase; and (ii) starting from any equilibrium, best-reply dynamics lead to a larger equilibrium following the parameter change.
Those results hold for multidimensional strategy spaces, be it discrete or continuous, functional spaces, as well as for payo¤s which need not be smooth or concave. In order to obtain the desired results only the monotonicity properties of incremental payo¤s and the order properties of strategies matter. The approach is based on monotone comparative statics results developed by Topkis (1978) and the application of Tarski's …xed point theorem to increasing functions (Tarski (1955) ).
Bayesian games
The approach has proved useful when analyzing Bayesian games, in particular the di¢ cult issue of existence of equilibrium in pure strategies with a continuum of types and/or actions. Results have been obtained for supermodular games with general action and type spaces (Vives (1990) ); for games in which each player uses a strategy increasing in type in response to increasing strategies of rivals (Athey (2001) ); and for "monotone supermodular" games with general action and type spaces (Van Zandt and Vives (2007) ). We will brie ‡y describe the last contribution and apply it to the analysis of a global game example in the next section.
Let T i (a subset of Euclidean space) be the set of possible types t i of player i. The types of the players are drawn from a common prior distribution on T = Q n i=0 T i , where T 0 is residual uncertainty not observed by any player. The action space of player i is a compact rectangle of Euclidean space A i , and his payo¤ is given by the (measurable and bounded) function i : A T ! R.
The ex post payo¤ to player i when the vector of actions is a = (a 1 ; :::; a n ) and when the realized types t = (t 1 ; :::; t n ) is thus i (a; t). Action spaces, payo¤ functions, type sets, and the prior distribution are common knowledge. The Bayesian game is described by (A i ; T i ; i ; i 2 N ).
A pure strategy for player i is a (measurable) function i : T i ! A i that assigns an action to every possible type of the player. Let i denote the strategy space of player i and identify two strategies if they are equal with probability 1. We can de…ne a natural order in the strategy space
, in the usual componentwise order, with probability one on T i . This formulation of a Bayesian game encompasses both common and private values as well as perfect or imperfect signals. (2007) show the following result. Let (T i ) be the set of probability distributions on T i and let player i's posteriors be given by the (measurable) function p i : T i ! (T i ), consistent with the prior (the common prior assumption can be relaxed). De…ne a monotone supermodular game as follows.
Van Zandt and Vives
1. Supermodularity in payo¤s: i supermodular in a i , and with increasing di¤erences in (a i ; a i ).
2. Complementarity between action and type: i has increasing di¤erences in (a i ; t).
Monotone posteriors: p i : T i ! (T i ) is increasing with respect to the partial order on
(T i ) of …rst-order stochastic dominance (a su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition is that the prior be a¢ liated).
In a monotone supermodular game there is a largest and a smallest Bayesian equilibrium and each one is in monotone strategies in type. There might be other equilibria that are in nonmonotone strategies but, if so, they will be between the largest and the smallest one, which are monotone in type. Furthermore, the extremal equilibria are increasing in the posteriors.
Monotone supermodular games have been applied to characterize equilibria in adoption games on graphs, multimarket oligopoly, team problems, and games of voluntary disclosure (see Vives (2005) ).
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Global games
Global games were introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) as games of incomplete information with types determined by each player observing a noisy signal of the underlying state. The aim is to select an equilibrium with a perturbation of a complete information game. The authors show that in 2 2 games if each player observes a noisy signal of the true payo¤s and if ex ante feasible payo¤s include payo¤s that make each action strictly dominant, then as noise becomes small an iterative strict dominance selects one equilibrium. The equilibrium selected is the risk-dominant one if there are two equilibria in the complete information game. Carlsson and van Damme do not explicitly consider supermodular games but when we have two equilibria in a complete information game, the game is one of strategic complementarities. Global games have been developed in a range of applications by Morris and Shin (2002) . I will present here an example, a variation of the simple framework of Section 2 with incomplete information, to highlight the power of the supermodular game approach.
Suppose an agent must decide whether or not to adopt a new technology (or whether to "invest", "act", or "participate"). The action is a i = 0 if there is no adoption and is a i = 1 if there is adoption.
The cost i of adoption for agent i follows a normal distribution with mean and variance 2 .
The parameters i and j ( j 6 = i) are potentially correlated with covariance 2 and correlation coe¢ cient 2 [0; 1). The bene…t of adoption is g (e a), where e a is the total mass adopting (between 0 and 1), and no adoption yields no bene…t. We have thus a variation, with idiosyncratic random parameter, of the simple framework where the payo¤ to player i is:
If g 0 > 0 then the game is monotone supermodular because (a i ; e a; i ) has increasing di¤erences in (a i ; (e a; i )) (that is, @ 2 =@a i @e a = g 0 (e a) > 0 and @ 2 =@a i @ ( i ) = 1 > 0) and types are a¢ liated (because of normality). It follows that extremal equilibria exist, are symmetric (because the game is symmetric), and are in monotone (decreasing) strategies of the form a i = 1 if and only if i b . Let g (e a) = e a with > 0 for purposes of illustration.
From the point of view of player i and given i , the adopting mass when other players use the equilibrium threshold b will be estimated by 
The solution will be unique ifr 0 < 1 or p (1 ) = (1 + ) ( ) 1 ( ) < 1, where ( ) is the density of the standard normal. It is then immediate 1 that the equilibrium will be unique when
This will be so when the degree of strategic complementarity is not too strong. This may happen either because payo¤ complementarities are weak ( low); or because each player ex ante faces a large cost uncertainty ( high); or because the correlation of the costs is high ( close but not equal to 1). All three factors tend to lessen the strength of strategic complementarities. Either with a di¤use prior or when the cost of a player gives very precise information about the costs of others, the (strategic) uncertainty of player i is maximal about the behavior of others.
In both cases cases the player puts very little weight on prior information: when 2 is very large because the prior is ‡at; when is close to 1 because the type of the player predicts almost perfectly the types of others. This induces a best response for the player which is quite " ‡at", that is, not very sensitive to the threshold used by others and uniqueness obtains.
A standard procedure in a global game (e.g. Morris and Shin (2002) ) would …nd the largest and smallest equilibrium thresholds by iterated elimination of dominated strategies, show that there is no loss of generality is assuming threshold strategies, and …nally …nd conditions under which the largest and smallest equilibrium thresholds coincide. 2 By using the theory of (monotone) supermodular
, where f is the density of x. 2 Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003) obtain a generalization of the uniqueness result to games of strategic complementarities. 8 games we obviate the step of solving the iterated elimination of dominated strategies process, because in a supermodular game extremal equilibria are the outcome of iterated elimination of dominated strategies; we obtain immediately that extremal equilibrium strategies are of the threshold form -because in a monotone supermodular game extremal equilibria are monotone in type; and we bring forward the intuition for the uniqueness result in terms of lessening the strength of strategic complementarities. This helps to understand why in some occasions reducing noise and in others increasing it is necessary to obtain a unique equilibrium.
Indeed, we can start by noting that the game is monotone supermodular. This means that extremal equilibria exist and are in monotone (threshold) strategies. Those extremal equilibria can be found starting at extremal points of the strategy sets of players ( b = 1 or b = 1) and iterating using best responses. Typically, we must make sure that the process is not stuck at extremal points of the strategy space (and boundary assumptions may be used for this purpose). The extremal equilibrium thresholds bound the set of rationalizable strategies, and if the equilibrium is unique then the game is dominance solvable. The condition for equilibrium uniqueness is precisely that strategic complementarities are not too strong.
In the region where equilibrium is unique we can perform easily comparative statics analysis. For example, we can check that there is a multiplier e¤ect of public information. An increase in will have an e¤ect on the equilibrium threshold b over and above the direct impact on the best response of a player @r=@ < 0. Indeed, the prior mean of can be understood as a public signal of 9 precision 2 1 and, exactly as in the simple framework,
whenever the uniqueness condition (r 0 < 1) is met since the game is of strategic complementarities (r 0 > 0). The multiplier is largest when r 0 is close to 1, that is, when we approach the multiplicity of equilibria region. The multiplier e¤ect of public information is emphasized by Morris and Shin (2002) in terms of the coordinating potential of public information beyond its strict information content. The reason is that public information becomes common knowledge and a¤ects the equilibrium outcome. Every player knows that an increase in will shift downward the best replies of the rest of the players and everyone will be more cautious in adopting.
The uniqueness property is nice in a game, but we can still perform comparative statics analysis in a game of strategic complementarities even if there are multiple equilibria. For example, in the uniqueness region, r 0 < 1, we have that
In the multiple equilibrium region the result still holds for extremal equilibrium thresholds -or for reasonable out-of-equilibrium dynamics that eliminate the middle "unstable" equilibrium. Indeed, we know that extremal equilibria of monotone supermodular games are increasing in the posteriors of the players. A su¢ cient statistic for the posterior of a player under normality is E ( j j i ) = i + (1 ) ; which is increasing in for < 1. It follows then that increasing will increase the extremal equilibrium thresholds.
